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A B S T R A C T
In the context of network incident monitoring, alerts are useful notiﬁcations that provide IT management staﬀ
with information about incidents. They are usually triggered in an automatic manner by network equipment and
monitoring systems, thus containing only technical information available to the systems that are generating
them. On the other hand, ticketing systems play a diﬀerent role in this context. Tickets represent the business
point of view of incidents. They are usually generated by human intervention and contain enriched semantic
information about ongoing and past incidents. In this article, our main hypothesis is that incorporating tickets
information into the alert correlation process will be beneﬁcial to the incident resolution life-cycle in terms of
accuracy, timing, and overall incident’s description. We propose a methodology to validate this hypothesis and
suggest a solution to the main challenges that appear. The proposed correlation approach is based on the time
alignment of the events (alerts and tickets) that aﬀect common elements in the network. For this we use real alert
and ticket datasets obtained from a large telecommunications network. The results have shown that using ticket
information enhances the incident resolution process, mainly by reducing and aggregating a higher percentage
of alerts compared with standard alert correlation systems that only use alerts as the main source of information.
Finally, we also show the applicability and usability of this model by applying it to a case study where we
analyze the performance of the management staﬀ.
1. Introduction
Nowadays, IT Service Management (ITSM) [1] tasks constitute a
heavy burden on the management staﬀ of modern telecommunication
networks, as these networks become larger and more complex in terms
of the diversity and the criticality of the services that they oﬀer to
customers. In addition to that, IT management is now a business-or-
iented service rather than just a process for network/systems manage-
ment. This means that IT services are adopted according to their con-
tributions to the required business processes. For this reason, network
experts are always trying to ﬁnd eﬃcient strategies to quickly solve
network incidents and improve the network uptime to comply with
committed Service Level Agreement (SLA).
ITSM adopts the Information Technology Infrastructure Library
(ITIL) framework [2], which is a widely accepted industry standard that
is deﬁned as the best practice in managing information technology
services and providing infrastructure, development and operations for
identifying, planning, delivering and supporting IT services for busi-
ness. Incident Management (IM) is one of the main processes deﬁned in
ITIL. Citing the ITIL terminology, an incident can be deﬁned as “an
unplanned interruption of an IT service or reduction in the quality of an IT
service. Failure of a conﬁguration item that has not yet impacted service is
also an incident” [3].
Typically, alerts are the main source of information used by man-
agement staﬀ to derive the existence of incidents. Alerts in the network
are collected by monitoring systems, which are intended to warn staﬀ in
network operation and management centers. The sensitivity of today’s
monitoring systems leads a huge amount of alerts being triggered per
day, which overwhelms management staﬀ. This issue makes it ad-
visable to use and develop additional systems to reduce this quantity of
alerts. Alerts correlation [4–7] is the primary technique employed to
handle this problem.
Alternately, Incident Ticketing Systems (ITSs), also known as
Service Desks as referred to by the ITIL terminology, are a primary tool
used by management staﬀ to track and report ongoing and resolved
incidents. ITSs store records called tickets, which can be created either
automatically by an ITS in response to receiving alerts or manually by
humans. In the latter case, tickets can be created from two diﬀerent
sources: (1) by the help desk staﬀ in response to receiving customers’
calls regarding some problems in the resources, and (2) by the
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management staﬀ, from the observed alerts but also from other symp-
toms and even due to some feedback from other technicians at diﬀerent
locations.
Although many of the records in ITSs contain semantically rich in-
formation related to incidents, to the best of our knowledge, only
limited eﬀorts have been devoted to the inclusion of this information in
the alert correlation procedure [8,9]. As the bulk of the tickets in ITSs
are created manually, they are ideal candidates for the addition of
further semantic information and human knowledge, both from the
management staﬀ and from the users of the services (through help desk
staﬀ), into the alert correlation procedure.
It is worth mentioning that in this work we are not concerned with
speciﬁc algorithms that extract information from natural language in
tickets but to show that they contain additional information that can be
used to correlate them with alerts. In our experiments we show that the
approach works even with a quite simplistic approach. As it will be
shown later, both datasets have some speciﬁcities that make this cor-
relation hard to be performed. Yet, despite these speciﬁcities, both
sources of information intersect in several ways, as they contain tech-
nical information about ongoing incidents, including human-expert
information in tickets. In the case study we present, every ticket is
characterized by several tenths of features, and we show that only some
of them contain technical information that is useful for the alert-ticket
correlation process.
The potential beneﬁts from this are threefold: (i) from the IT user
perspective, the proposed methodology can enhance the user expecta-
tions regarding IT service quality by speeding up the incident resolution
process; (ii) from the IT management perspective, better event corre-
lation rates would be obtained, i.e., a larger and more reliable reduction
in the number of alerts. This last beneﬁt enhances the incident detection
accuracy and reduces False Positives (FPs). Finally, (iii) from the deci-
sion making perspective, managers would receive more accurate in-
formation with regard to the real incidents that occur in the network
and their descriptions. This potentially improves incident management
cycles, as it provides a more accurate feedback on the Quality of Service
(QoS) in the incident management process, and shows how the diﬀerent
teams involved in the process behave.
In this article, our main contribution is to show that incorporating
the information found in tickets into the alert correlation system sig-
niﬁcantly improves the correlation of the events, and thus the overall
incident resolution process. For this, we propose a methodology to
correlate tickets and alerts (events in the system) based on an in-
tentionally simple algorithm, as our purpose is to show that even with a
simple correlation criterion, the contribution of tickets to the correla-
tion process is beneﬁcial for both management and decision making
processes. The proposed correlation approach is based on the time
alignment of the events (alerts and tickets) that aﬀect common ele-
ments in the network. Thus, the algorithm groups together all the
events related to the same incident in what we call representative events,
that summarize all the information from the grouped elements. Ideally,
at the end of the algorithm execution, a single representative event per
incident is provided.
We evaluate the proposal with a real dataset from a company that is
in charge of the operation and management of a corporate network that
provides services to a regional government. The network serves mil-
lions of habitants from many public sectors, such as education, health
and civil, among others, and includes a help desk center that generates
tickets directly from end users complaints. Furthermore, we show the
applicability and usefulness of the proposed solution by applying it in
two scenarios: ﬁrst, in the alert correlation process, especially for re-
ducing and aggregating a larger number of related alerts. Second, in
assessing the performance of the management staﬀ in terms of their
speed, accuracy and the eﬃciency achieved by the diﬀerent manage-
ment groups in the entire incident resolution process.
The structure of the article is as follows. First, a review of the related
work is summarized in Section 2. Then, a basic model for event
correlation is presented in Section 3. Based on this model, a complete
system for ticket-alert correlation is proposed and discussed in
Section 4. A thorough explanations of the proposed ticket-alert corre-
lation model, the arising challenges and the suggested solutions are
provided in Section 5. The correlation model is experimentally tested
and evaluated through a case study utilizing the dataset taken from a
real management company in Section 6. Some applications of the
proposed model are listed in Section 7. Finally, in Section 8, we draw
various conclusions and provide insights into further works.
2. Related work
Despite the large amount of research eﬀort that has been carried out
in the alert correlation ﬁeld [10–15], this is still an active research area
in both NMS and IT security. This is mainly because the eﬃciency and
robustness of the used models and the proposed algorithms vary from
system to system, but none of them have thus far succeeded in pro-
viding an optimal solution to this problem in terms of reducing the
number of alerts to a single alert per incident [16–18].
The information considered during the alert correlation process can
derive from many diﬀerent sources of information [19], e.g., topological
information that provides an accurate representation of the monitored
network as a set of links and nodes [20,21]. In particular, the re-
presentation of the location of nodes and the connectivity and direction
of the existing links are of particular relevance. Network topology in-
formation usually contains extensive details about the network and
equipment structure, such as switches, routers, and servers; conﬁgura-
tion parameters, such as IP addresses and their matchings to names,
subnets or virtual LANs; and host information, such as OS type and open
services.
Many of the alert correlation techniques adopt expert rules and si-
milarity-based correlation methods [22–26], aiming to reduce the total
number of alerts by aggregating them using their similarities. The main
assumption behind similarity-based techniques is that similar alerts
tend to have the same root causes or similar eﬀects on the monitored
system. How to deﬁne similarity measures is a critical performance
issue for such techniques. To answer this question, several similarity
measures have been used by many researchers [27–29]. The aim is to
deﬁne a suitable similarity function for each attribute observed in the
alerts because attributes may have diﬀerent weights and eﬀects on the
overall correlation process.
Some authors have applied data mining methods for alert correla-
tion analysis, such as association rules mining [30–33], incremental
frequent mining [34], and sequential pattern mining [35,36]. Their aim
is to automate the process of ﬁnding meaningful activities and inter-
esting features from training datasets and build a knowledgebase that
can be used for the alert correlation process in real-time. The main
drawback of this approach is the heavy load imposed on the system to
build models that dynamically adapt to new conditions.
Alternately, some research eﬀorts, such as those in [37–39], have
noted the importance of ticket correlation for incident resolution,
claiming that the latter can be extended with advanced functions to
enhance the incident resolution process, as the information in the
tickets is related to incidents generated by events that have already
been identiﬁed as network failures, and as such, some related alerts
should exist. Other eﬀorts, such as those in [40–42], use ITSs for several
purposes, such as studying and characterizing the nature and causes of
routing changes and the observed instability. In these references, the
authors use simple ticket preprocessing operations to reduce the total
number of tickets before correlating them. However, they do not deeply
analyze the ITS, and the correlation of the tickets is not targeted at
reaching one ticket per incident.
In another research line, in [43] the authors proposed an intrusion
detection model that leverages contextual information to create attack
prediction models driven by database and graph mining techniques.
The proposed approach automatically identiﬁes and queries ﬂows to
S. Salah et al. Information Fusion 45 (2019) 38–52
39
generate semantic links among alerts raised in response to suspicious
activities. It consists of two main phases: the preprocessing phase,
which leverages previous ﬂows to create a ﬂow classiﬁcation model,
called Semantic Link Network (SLN); and the prediction phase, which
occurs at run-time and takes incoming ﬂows as inputs, and produces an
initial prediction of whether they are suspicious or benign. Despite the
main contribution of our work not being targeted at modeling the
process associated to an attack, considering context-aware correlation
approaches like the one presented in this work has some beneﬁcial
outcomes to our approach and might be used as an insight for future
improvements or a conﬁrmation on the existence of proﬁtable semantic
information.
To the best of our knowledge, despite its potential for obtaining
various useful statistical measures to study the nature of incidents and
their eﬀects on network stability [44,45], no eﬀorts have been devoted
to the use of information from the tickets in the alert correlation process
itself (joint correlation), targeted at increasing the percentage of re-
duction in the number of alerts and the signiﬁcance of the resulting
events.
Finally, despite the availability of a large number of monitoring
tools such as Logstash [46], Splunk [47], and Sumo Logic [48], which
are mainly designed to assist in storing and analyzing log ﬁles from the
point of view facilitating the management process, we did not ﬁnd
speciﬁc solutions to the challenges described in this article.
In summary, the aim of this work is diﬀerent than that of the cited
references. The proposed method is expected to produce a ﬁnal set of
incidents that more accurately represent the real incidents in the net-
work when compared with standard alert correlation systems that only
use the alerts as the main source of information.
3. Basic model for event correlation
Before discussing the ticket-alert correlation process in more detail,
we introduce various terminologies in this section and provide a brief
overview of the basic event correlation model that we use as a basic
building block for the correlation process. As will be shown, this basic
model is intentionally simple because its main purpose is just to serve as
a basic criterion upon which our ticket-alert correlation proposal is
built. As previously discussed, the main goal of this article is showing
that even when the underlying correlation algorithm is simple, the
contribution of tickets to the alert correlation process is substantial.
In a ﬁrst step, we consider both the appearance of alerts in the NMS
and the generation of tickets in the ITS system as generic events. This
way, whenever an incident takes place in a monitored network, a set of
diﬀerent events related to that incident appear. Let us denote as I (see
Table 1 for a summary of the notation) the set of m diﬀerent events
(e.g., alerts or tickets) that appear as a consequence of an incident
occurring in a network: = …I e e e{ , , , }m1 2 .
Every event ei has a diﬀerent duration, spanning from the instant of
its creation or appearance, which we call the event creation time, t ,eCTi to
the instant at which this event ﬁnishes or is resolved, which we call the
event resolution time, teRTi .
In addition, every event ei is associated with one or more elements
of the network, which we call the aﬀected elements of that event. For
example, in a “node down” alert, the node of the network that has gone
down is the aﬀected element of that event. Note that an event could
have several aﬀected elements. For example, if a ticket is created due to
the failure of several nodes in a network, all of them are really the
aﬀected elements for that event. In general, we will say that every event
ei will have a set of aﬀected elements, Ei, which is a list of the diﬀerent
identiﬁers of the network elements, applications, services, etc. aﬀected
by the incident described in that event. An identiﬁer here could be an IP
address, a node name, a service name, etc.
Furthermore, every event ei is also speciﬁed by an event description,
Di, which is usually a free text ﬁeld describing the event, its eﬀects on
the network, and/or the root cause of its appearance.
Normally, when an incident occurs in a network, many diﬀerent
alerts and tickets (events in general) are generated. Here, it is desirable
that an ideal event correlation algorithm provides a single event for this
incident that contains all of the semantic information extracted from
the set of related alerts and tickets. Thus, we are ﬁrst interested in the
correlation of all the events that belong to an incident I so that a single
event can represent the entire incident. We refer to this single event as
the representative event for incident I, eR. To be coherent with the de-
scription of the set I, the duration of the event eR should span from the
earliest event creation time from the events in I to the last event re-
solution time observed in the set of events for that incident. Fig. 1
shows an example of this deﬁnition, where a set of m events belonging
to the incident I are represented by a single representative event eR.
Note that in realistic scenarios, the duration of the representative
event might not match the real incident duration, mainly due to the fact
that when the incident starts, a delay could occur before the ﬁrst event
appears; and the same could occur when the incident ﬁnishes, that is, it
would be usual to have a delay between the end of the incident and the
closing (resolution) of a ticket. Thus, we deﬁne a Forward Oﬀset Delay,
FOD, as the delay between the real start of the incident (SoI) and the
time at which the ﬁrst event appears. In addition, we deﬁne a Backward
Oﬀset Delay, BOD, i.e., the delay between the real end of the incident
Table 1
List of acronyms and symbols with their descriptions.
Acronym/symbol Description
FOD Forward oﬀset delay
BOD Backward oﬀset delay
SoI Start of incident
EoI End of incident
AR Representative alert
TR Representative ticket
AP Set of alerts after preprocessing
TP Set of tickets after preprocessing
AC Set of alerts after correlation
TC Set of tickets after correlation
Di Event ith description
Ei Set of aﬀected elements for event ith
I Set of incidents
tei
CT Event ith creation time
tei
RT Event ith resolution time
eR Representative event
Iactual Number of real incidents
IA Number of incidents extracted from alert dataset
IT Number of incidents extracted from ticket dataset
tCT Ticket creation time
tRT Ticket resolution time
Fig. 1. Correlation of m events belonging to the same incident into a representative event.
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(EoI) and the closing time of all the related events. Note that BOD could
take a negative value in the case that the last event ends before the
incident. As an example, if we consider the events to be tickets that are
manually created and closed by a member of the management staﬀ, it
could happen that the member believed an incident had ﬁnished while
it was actually still active. In this case, the member would close the
ticket (the end of the event), thus assigning to BOD a negative value.
These two measures will be relevant for the proper handling of events
that occur near in time, as they are related to the time misalignments
between the real incident and its perceived eﬀects. We consider them in
the ticket-alert correlation algorithm proposed in Section 5.
3.1. Tickets vs. alerts
Despite the fact that we generally consider both tickets and alerts as
events, it is important to highlight that there are relevant diﬀerences
among them and, thus, some challenges appear when trying to combine
both.
The main diﬀerence between alerts and tickets appears in the nature
of the information they contain, mainly due to the own management
process. Alerts are automatically triggered by network equipments and
systems and, thus, they incorporate automated information. On the
other hand, tickets are normally generated by humans, either when a
service desk call is received, or when the management staﬀ receives any
kind of notiﬁcation about ongoing incidents. This implies that tickets
will incorporate human expert knowledge, while alerts will not. Note
that even in the case that tickets are automatically generated when
alerts arrive, operators are usually allowed to add expert information.
While it is expected that alerts should be usually associated with
tickets, in realistic scenarios we may have alerts without related tickets
and vice versa. To clarify this point consider an example from the in-
trusion detection ﬁeld where a Web server is a victim of a low-rate
denial of service (DoS) attack [49,50]. This type of attacks succeeds to
defeat application servers only by sending them low-rate traﬃc in an
intelligent way, and can easily bypass detection mechanisms, so no alert
is generated by these traﬃc monitoring systems. In this case, as no alert
is created in the system, the incident could remain undetected even
when using alert correlation. Yet in this scenario, any Web user might
denounce the unavailability of the Web server by calling the service
desk. There, an operator would open a corresponding ticket. As a result,
we do not expect to have related alerts for every created ticket. In this
regard, we have explored real datasets (See Section 6) and found some
relevant properties that strongly suggest that they are separated sources
with diﬀerent information.
Furthermore, as tickets and alerts are generated following diﬀerent
processes, they contain diﬀerent information. Some of the challenges
that appear when dealing with the information in both tickets and alerts
are:
• Information structure: Information contained in alerts is usually
structured. This is due to the fact that it is automatically generated
by the monitoring systems. On the other hand, many of the in-
formation contained in tickets is not structured, as it is manually
generated and maintained by humans.
• Timing information: Alerts are automatically triggered by mon-
itoring systems that are reactive enough to quickly respond and
rapidly generate alerts. Thus, the delay between the beginning of an
incident and the ﬁrst alert creation time is almost negligible.
Whereas, in ITS, and especially for those tickets that need human
intervention, a perceivable and even signiﬁcant delay in ticket
creation can appear. Thus, these timing oﬀsets introduce a real
challenge when trying to correlate alerts and tickets. As it will be
shown in Section 5, we argue that alerts contain more accurate
timing information about incident lifetimes than tickets.
• Semantic information: Since a ticket contains many free text ﬁelds,
ticket creators and those that manage them feel free to describe the
incident, its possible causes and the solutions applied to solve it in
more detail. Therefore, tickets are expected to provide better in-
formation than alerts with regard to identifying and describing the
actual incidents that occur in a network.
• Preprocessing steps: Both datasets may contain duplicated or re-
dundant records. The processes applied to ﬁlter and remove these
records are diﬀerent as they present diﬀerent ﬁeld types, even in-
cluding non-structured data in the case of tickets. Furthermore,
unlike the alert dataset, the ticketing system is a multipurpose
system that can be used not only for incident resolution, but also to
register informative data for administrative issues such as scheduled
maintenance or system update. This implies diﬀerent preprocessing
criteria and constitutes a big challenge when trying to ﬁlter out
alerts and tickets not directly related to incidents.
As will be shown in Section 5, applying the basic event correlation
model that follows for both tickets and alerts is not straightforward, and
the proposed correlation algorithm considers these challenges in its
design.
3.2. Basic correlation method
Suppose now that we have a set of m events and that we do not have
any information about the incidents they are related to. We are inter-
ested in obtaining the same number of representative events as that of
the incidents that originated those events. To achieve this in this basic
model for event correlation, we assume the following hypothesis:
Two events that (i) have a similar description or have an aﬀected element
in common, i.e., are related to the same network nodes, and (ii) happen
simultaneously in time will likely belong to the same incident.
Mathematically, the ﬁrst condition, i.e., the similarity in the de-
scription or the aﬀected elements of two events ei and ej, can be de-
scribed by the following expression:
∩ ≠ ∩ ≠E E ϕ OR D D ϕ{ } { }i j i j (1)
while the second condition, i.e., the simultaneous occurrence of two
events ei and ej, is given by
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ={ } { }t t t OR t t t trueeCT eCT eRT eCT eCT eRTi j i j i j (2)
Note that the conditions Ei ∩ Ej and Di ∩Dj represent the intersection
of two text-free ﬁelds. Although there exist many alternatives to de-
termine a metric to decide if an intersection is present [51], we have
opted for a very simple model to justify that, even in these conditions,
the inclusion of tickets provides beneﬁts. In case of the condition Ei ∩ Ej,
as will be detailed in Section 6, every list Ei is built by mining text-free
ﬁelds and searching node identiﬁers present in a predeﬁned list. Thus,
two ﬁelds Ei and Ej intersect when they contain at least one identiﬁer in
common. Regarding the condition Di ∩Dj, we have included this con-
dition in the model for the sake of completeness. However, to make our
approach as simple as possible, we do not truly apply it in our experi-
ments such that no comparison of free text ﬁelds regarding descriptions
is conducted at all. That said, a more advanced algorithm could be
selected from the proposed solutions for text mining in the literature
[51].
In our basic correlation algorithm, if the above two rules are ful-
ﬁlled by any group of events, we conclude that they are all related to
the same incident, and we simply aggregate them into one re-
presentative event, eR, having the following properties (see Fig. 1):
=
∈
{ }t tmineCT
i m
e
CT
{1, }R i (3)
=
∈
{ }t tmaxeRT
i m
e
RT
{1, }R i (4)
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Note that we join all of the descriptions Di of the diﬀerent events
and the set of event-aﬀected elements, Ei, as we consider that any in-
formation in one of the events in an incident will complement the in-
formation provided in other events in the same incident.
4. Ticket-alert correlation system
Fig. 2 shows the proposed ticket-alert correlation system. It mainly
consists of three modules: a module for ticket correlation, another for
alert correlation and the last for ticket-alert joint correlation.
The ticket correlation module is represented in the upper part of the
ﬁgure. A set of raw tickets, TR, obtained from the ITS is entered as an
input to the ticket preprocessing phase to normalize and extract only
relevant tickets, as will be explained next. The resulting processed set,
TP, is then passed through a ticket correlation phase, which, based on the
basic model for event correlation explained in Section 3, produces a
new set of representative tickets, TC. Every representative ticket, which is
ideally expected to represent a single incident, contains the summary of
a group of correlated tickets.
The lower part of Fig. 2 represents the alert correlation module.
Here, a set of raw alerts, AR, usually triggered by a monitoring system, is
entered as input to an alert preprocessing phase to normalize and extract
only relevant alerts, as will be explained next. The resulting processed
set, AP, is then passed through an alert correlation phase, also based on
the basic model for event correlation (Section 3), to produce a new set,
AC, which is the ﬁnal set of representative alerts. Every representative
alert is expected to ideally represent a single incident, containing a
summary of the information provided by a group of correlated alerts.
Finally, the right-hand side of Fig. 2 represents the ticket-alert
correlation module. Here, the outputs of the alert and ticket correlation
modules, AC and TC, are entered as inputs, and the processing is per-
formed according to the correlation model presented in Section 5. The
aim is to produce a ﬁnal set of incidents, I, that will more accurately
represent the real incidents in the network compared with methods that
only account for alert correlation. In the following subsections, we
provide a more detailed discussion regarding each module separately.
4.1. Ticket correlation module
The inputs for this module are the tickets obtained from an ITS
database. ITSs are considered essential tools for tracking resolution
activities associated with incidents in corporate networks. Each record
in an ITS represents a ticket that has information related to an incident.
Normally, an incident is perceived by the management staﬀ by obser-
ving events generated by monitoring software or by receiving custo-
mers’ complaints. These events, called tickets, contain information such
as Node IDs (aﬀected elements in our basic event correlation model),
which are identiﬁers of the main network element/s or service/s af-
fected by the incident reported in the ticket; ticket timestamps, such as
ticket creation and resolution times; and incident description ﬁelds (de-
scriptions in our basic event correlation model), such as an incident
summary, a worklog history and a solution description containing all
the procedures used to solve the incident. Tickets may also contain
ﬁelds storing administrative information, such as the management
groups involved in the resolution process, along with their contact in-
formation, among things.
In this module, the tickets are ﬁrst introduced in a ticket preproces-
sing phase. The aim is to extract only relevant tickets, or tickets related to
real network incidents. It is worth noting here that ITSs are used as
dual-task systems: they can be used for purposes other than registering
incidents’ lifecycles. For example, they are normally used to record
other administrative and maintenance tasks, e.g., programmed work in
the network or availability of a new software release. Therefore, be-
cause not all tickets are created as a consequence of actual network
incidents, we might say that some tickets are informative. Thus, we ﬁrst
normalize the data and obtain in a proper format the diﬀerent tickets’
ﬁelds that are relevant from the point of view of incident solving and
remove the remaining information in every ticket. Second, we discard
malformed tickets, that is, tickets having some incoherent values, as well
as informative tickets. To discern which tickets are informative, a
common method is to use a pre-deﬁned list of keywords and pattern-
matching techniques.
The output of the ticket preprocessing phase is fed as an input to the
ticket correlation phase. This process is well studied in our previous work
[52]. Essentially, we apply our basic event correlation algorithm (See
Section 3) with several adaptations. In a ﬁrst step, we obtain the main
aﬀected element of every ticket, usually clearly stated in a ﬁeld called
“Node ID” in ticketing systems, and make the correlation considering all
the tickets that have only this aﬀected element. In a second step, we
obtain more information regarding aﬀected elements from other tickets’
ﬁelds related to the description of the incident, such as worklogs and
solution descriptions. In [52], we show that this leads to a considerable
improvement in the incident resolution process in terms of accuracy,
timing, and incident description.
4.2. Alert correlation module
Alerts are usually generated by network elements and obtained by
management platforms, e.g., syslog or HP OpenView, using manage-
ment protocols, such as SNMP. Each alert is a short message with a
speciﬁc textual format deﬁned by equipment vendors and is generated
as an external manifestation of a potential failure or disorder occurring
in a piece of equipment of the managed network or system. Typically,
alerts contain the same relevant information as that described in our
basic model presented in Section 3, such as (i) aﬀected element identi-
ﬁer, e.g., node ID and interface ID, (ii) the timing information of
the alert, i.e., the creation and resolution times, and (iii) a description of
the fault, i.e., the root cause and the severity of the alert. Moreover,
alerts may provide information with diﬀerent detail levels, such as
speciﬁc data regarding the status of the devices and their conﬁgurations
or higher level details with aggregated information gathered from
several alerts.
Alerts are ﬁrst passed to a preprocessing phase, with the aim of se-
lecting only relevant alerts: alerts related to relevant incidents. It is
worth mentioning here that today’s monitoring systems trigger a huge
amount of so-called normal-behavior alerts in response to daily opera-
tional tasks that are not really related to real network incidents, i.e.,
maintenance activities, software updates, etc. Thus, to ﬁlter
Fig. 2. Proposed architecture for the ticket-alert correlation system.
S. Salah et al. Information Fusion 45 (2019) 38–52
42
nonrelevant alerts, we use a pre-deﬁned list of keywords and some
pattern matching techniques. In the experimental section we provide
more details about this process.
The output of the preprocessing phase is fed into an alert correlation
phase. Here, a similar approach to that followed in the ticket correlation
phase is utilized: we use the basic event correlation model (Section 3) in
two steps. First, we only consider alerts that are related to a single af-
fected element, and in a second step, we incorporate those alerts that are
related to a list of several aﬀected elements. These last alerts are nor-
mally generated by intermediate network elements that really correlate
several of them and generate a new alert with the summarized in-
formation.
Note that this module is very similar to the ticket correlation
module. It is remarkable to say that traditionally, this is the only
module that has been implemented in network alert correlation sys-
tems, and a large amount of research eﬀort has been devoted to
studying it [5,7,9,10,19]. In our case, we are not as interested in re-
ﬁning this module as in evaluating whether the incorporation of tickets’
information would improve the alert correlation process. For this
reason, and for ease, we have opted for this implementation.
4.3. Ticket-alert correlation module
This module works with the information provided by both the alert
and ticket correlation modules. As previously explained, we are mainly
interested in evaluating whether introducing this module would result
in a beneﬁt in the correlation process.
Our intuition is that the tickets can introduce relevant information
in the procedure, incorporating human knowledge and signiﬁcance to
the events. An example of a scenario revealing this is depicted in Fig. 3.
In the ﬁrst timeline, we can observe the result from an alert correlation
process, where three clusters of alerts are summarized in three re-
presentative alerts: AR1, AR2 and AR3. The second timeline represents
the output from the ticket correlation process, where a single re-
presentative ticket, TR, has been obtained. The third timeline represents
the duration of the incident that generated the diﬀerent events (alerts
and tickets).
Note that the alerts in this incident appear intermittently, which
makes the correlation process consider that they are not overlapped in
time and are thus not likely to belong to the same incident. However,
the existence of tickets makes it possible to observe the concurrence in
time between the three groups of alerts and tickets, thus allowing the
correlation of all of them to represent a single incident.
We can further clarify this example by using a real scenario with
alerts and tickets taken from the dataset that we analyze below in
Section 6. Fig. 4 shows the set of alerts after preprocessing (24 alerts)
that are considered in this example. These alerts are triggered by two
diﬀerent network nodes, namely NIX1-FORTIGATE and AVPN-CEIC-
039, with 20 and 4 alerts, respectively. The basic alert correlation
operations that we applied here are able to group this set of alerts into
ﬁve clusters (3 for NIX1-FORTIGATE, and 2 for AVPN-CEIC-039) based
on the timing and some topological information (basically Node ID).
The ﬁrst 13 alerts are overlapped in time and have the same common
Node ID (NIX1-FORTIGATE). Thus, they are grouped into one re-
presentative alert aggregating all of them (Cluster # 1). The next 5 are
also grouped into a single ”event” that represents this group (Cluster #
2); ﬁnally, the last 2 are treated in the same way (Cluster # 3). Re-
garding the alerts generated by node AVPN-CEIC-039, the correlation
method generates 2 clusters (# 4 and # 5). Thus, the output after alert
correlation would be composed of ﬁve groups of aggregated alerts.
Fig. 5 shows the corresponding ticket for this set of alerts after pre-
processing and extracting the useful features. As we will discuss in
Section 6, it is worth noting that in the considered ticketing system,
every ticket is characterized by 273 diﬀerent ﬁelds. Thus, only the re-
levant ﬁelds are shown in Fig. 5. Observing the ticket, it is clear that
this information intersects with that from alerts in several ﬁelds, e.g.,
Node ID, Description, Interface ID, and timing information.
Therefore, as a primer solution, we could use these ﬁelds to corre-
late both sources of information as shown in Fig. 6. In this ﬁgure, we
draw over time the ticket and the considered 24 alerts. In the upper
timeline we draw the ticket lifetime considering both creation and re-
solution times. In the second timeline we draw the 24 alerts and show
their overlapping periods and the ﬁve created clusters after applying
the basic event correlation model (see Section 3.2). Without con-
sidering ticket information, the basic event correlation model would
Fig. 3. Example of alert aggregation using the proposed model.
Fig. 4. A snapshot of the set of alerts considered in the example.
Fig. 5. A snapshot of the ticket considered in the example.
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create ﬁve uncorrelated clusters of alerts despite being related to the
same incident. This is due to the fact that in real scenarios like the
example it is usual to have unpredictable time gaps between alerts that
make it hard to guess their relationship. Besides, it is hard to correlate
alerts coming from diﬀerent network nodes. In our case, by in-
corporating the ticket information we observe that the ﬁve alert clusters
overlap with the ticket, and consequently we can consider that they
belong to the same incident. The ﬁnal number of events to be con-
sidered in this example is then reduced to 1 instead of 5, which supports
the idea that using the ticket makes it possible to correlate them to-
gether (see incident timeline in Fig. 6).
This illustrative example gives clear indications of the beneﬁcial
outcomes provided to both technical and decision-making staﬀ. For
example, from the point of view of eﬃciency, having a single incident
with more information might reduce the resolution time. From an audit
perspective, having more realistic information about the real incidents
solved by management staﬀ will help in the decision-making process.
5. Ticket-alert correlation model
To apply the basic event correlation model suggested in Section 3 to
correlate both tickets and alerts, it is important to ﬁrst understand the
speciﬁcities of both tickets and alerts (see Section 3.1) and then prop-
erly design a correlation algorithm able to handle the associated chal-
lenges. In the following, we ﬁrst discuss the speciﬁc issues to be taken
into account and then suggest our proposal for the correlation algo-
rithm.
• Tickets provide better semantic information than alerts
Although tickets can be automatically generated by the NMS (au-
tomatic tickets), they are usually generated manually by the mem-
bers of the staﬀ, either as a response to alerts or from customers’
complaints. Every ticket represents a complete record of an incident
to be used by the management team during the incident manage-
ment lifecycle.
Normally, tickets contain more semantic information about the in-
cidents than alerts. First, every ticket contains many free text ﬁelds,
which are used by ticket creators and resolvers to clearly describe
the incident, its possible causes and the solutions applied to solve it.
In alerts, these ﬁelds are normally automatically generated by net-
work facilities, and thus the semantic information is very restricted
to a list of possible values. Second, tickets are generated by humans
only when alert events are considered so important that a record of
an incident is needed. For example, the appearance of alerts re-
garding non-production services, alerts generated by low-priority
nodes in a network, or warning alerts of low-priority should not
cause the creation of tickets, as these events should not be con-
sidered as incidents.
Thus, tickets are expected to provide better information than alerts
with regard to identifying the actual number of incidents that occur
in a network. If we assume that the number of incidents derived
from a ticket correlation process is IT, the number of incidents noted
by an alert correlation process is IA, and the number of real incidents
is Iactual, we expect to have the following relation:
< < <I I Iactual T A (7)
For this reason, we show in our correlation algorithm that we pay
more attention to tickets when deciding the number of incidents.
• Alerts provide better temporal information than tickets
In contrast with our higher conﬁdence in the semantic information
contained in tickets, we claim that the temporal information found
in them is less trustworthy than that provided by alerts. This is
because in the ITS system, a large number of tickets are created or
closed manually by the management staﬀ; thus, their responsiveness
is not as fast as in the alert management system where alerts are
generated automatically in a few milliseconds when an event is
perceived. Thus, to determine the beginning and end times of an
incident, we consider the timestamps provided by alerts to be the
best approximations.
Going back to Fig. 2, in which we show the complete system, note
that instead of considering both tickets and alerts as general events
and applying our basic event correlation algorithm to the complete
set, we separate both into two processes. This will allow us to de-
termine and identify the number of diﬀerent incidents (and their
semantic information) from the ticket correlation process and adjust
their temporal information from the feedback provided by the alert
correlation process. In summary, the output of ticket correlation is
reﬁned with the alert correlation output to adjust the time in-
formation of the incidents noted by tickets.
• Dealing with border eﬀects and the existence of consecutive incidents
As previously mentioned, it is expected to have some temporary
misalignments between the start and end of an incident and the
opening and closing times of the associated ticket(s) due to, pre-
sumably, human response times. This eﬀect has been included in the
basic correlation model through the parameters FOD and BOD. At
ﬁrst sight (Fig. 7), the problem with these two delays is that it is
possible to exclude or include events related or not really related,
respectively, to the ongoing incident in the representative event
and, therefore, in the incident as perceived after the correlation
process. As depicted in the example in Fig. 7, depending on whether
the ﬁrst event in the events line is an alert or a ticket, it is even
possible for the appearance of two diﬀerent incidents at the begin-
ning, while two diﬀerent incidents can be merged at the end. In
contrast, it is also possible for the staﬀ members to prematurely
close a ticket if they have the perception that the problem is solved,
thus making BOD negative. In this case, it is highly probable that
another ticket truly related to the same incident will appear after
some delay. In fact, this is exactly the former situation in the case
that the ﬁrst event in the event line is a ticket.
Fig. 6. A graphical time representation of the alerts, the ticket, and the generated in-
cident.
Fig. 7. Potential eﬀects of FOD and BOD on the correlation results.
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To handle this situation, our main argument is that there is a high
probability that potentially correlated events that occur in the
proximities of other representative events really belong to the same
incident. This way, the simultaneity condition –Eq. (2)– used to
merge events is relaxed by considering FOD and BOD as thresholds
to consider alerts and tickets in the proximity as included in the
same incident.
From the point of view of the correlation method, the major impact
is expected to arise from the “orphan” alerts, that is, from that alerts
at the beginning or end of an incident that are not assigned to it due
to the border eﬀects. Therefore, some experimental tuning is needed
to estimate the values for both FOD and BOD. Obviously, this is
addressed in the experimental setup.
Nevertheless, the scenario can become a bit more complex when
consecutive incidents appear. The problem is how to discriminate
between any two consecutive incidents having some properties in
common, i.e., how to correctly separate events that could corre-
spond to both incidents or even decide that both incidents are the
same and should be merged. To clarify this point, we show an ex-
ample in Fig. 8. Here, we assume that we have two truly consecutive
incidents, I1 and I2, each one starting and ending at the instants
shown in the incidents timeline. We also have a sequence of events,
each one starting and ending as shown in the events timeline. Fur-
thermore, we assume that each of these events is related to either I1
or I2. If we apply the basic event correlation model suggested in
Section 3, we obtain two representative events, eR1 and eR2, as
shown in the third timeline (Rep. events), which, at the same time,
will be considered the incidents from our point of view.
If we look carefully at this example, we observe that some events are
discarded from the correlation process and are not correlated simply
because they do not overlap with any other event. We can assume
that the non-overlapped events belong to other diﬀerent incidents,
in which case we would have up to seven diﬀerent incidents, far
more than the actual two incidents.
Thus, directly applying the basic event correlation model in this
example would lead to inaccuracies, especially when alert events are
considered because, as mentioned above, alerts may appear earlier
than tickets and might not overlap with them, and they may not be
considered in the correlation process.
In addition, note that there is another problem when consecutive
incidents are considered as in our example. We must select the
speciﬁc incident, if any, to which the events in between belong. In
our example, there are three events between eR1 and eR2. The choice
of assignment between event-incident modiﬁes the duration of both
incidents, thus aﬀecting the accuracy of the system.
5.1. Ticket-alert correlation algorithm
To handle all of the above issues, we modify the basic correlation
model to consider non-overlapped subsets of tickets and alerts as ex-
plained before. As shown in Fig. 1, FOD and BOD will be used as extra
delay thresholds so that an event is correlated to a representative event,
eR, that is active in the time interval [tCT, tRT] if that event satisﬁes
Eq. (1), that is, if it satisﬁes the similarity criteria and is active in the
interval
− +t FOD t BOD[ , ]CT RT (8)
Note that, with the expansion of the intervals with FOD and BOD, it
might happen that the extended intervals of two consecutive incidents
sharing some aﬀected element overlap. In this case, two operations are
considered: (i) any potentially related event falling in these intervals
will be assigned to the nearest-in-time representative event, and (ii) the
incidents will be merged only if, after adding the in-between events,
they are overlapping. Thus, extended intervals are not considered valid
for merging incidents simply based on the new limits.
It is obvious that the selection of the values of FOD and BOD directly
aﬀects the performance of the correlation algorithm. In Section 6, we
show how to experimentally determine optimal values for these para-
meters and how they aﬀect the overall results.
In summary, we propose an algorithm (Listing 1) that starts from an
empty list of incidents and consists of two iterations. First, it takes every
representative ticket from the correlated tickets set, TC, each of which is
considered to represent diﬀerent incidents. It is worth noting that as a
result of the ticket correlation, none of those tickets are overlapped in
time. For each incident (or representative ticket), the diﬀerent model
parameters are extracted (creation and resolution times, aﬀected ele-
ments and descriptions). Then, it searches for correlated representative
alerts. Thus, every representative ticket has a list of correlated alerts
assigned to it, and the temporary limits (SoI and EoI) of the incidents
are revisited according to the new information. Second, after extracting
a tuple of correlated tickets and alerts, in the second iteration, the al-
gorithm takes every correlated ticket and its associated list of correlated
alerts and searches for other tickets having at least one alert in
common. The target of this step is to join the representative tickets that
resulted in being overlapped after adding the alerts in the ﬁrst step. All
matched tickets are aggregated into a single one including all the in-
formation from the entire group. Finally, SoI and EoI are determined
by, respectively, taking the ﬁrst of the creation times of any of the alerts
in the correlated set or the ticket creation time (line 42) and the last of
the resolution times of any of the alerts or the ticket resolution time
(line 43).
The ﬁnal output is a set, SI, of k incidents, such that
= …S I I I I{ , , , , },I k1 2 3 being a single incident =I T A T T{ , , , },C C E D where TC
and AC are the subsets of correlated tickets and alerts for this incident,
respectively, TE is the list of aﬀected elements, and TD is the description
of the incident. This set SI is the estimation of the actual incidents re-
presented by all the events (tickets and alerts).
6. Experimental results
In this section we present the experimental assessment of the pro-
posal using datasets of tickets and alerts captured in a real production
network. According to the main target of the paper, our purpose is to
check the usefulness of the joint use of tickets and alerts in the event
correlation procedures. For this, we must tune the parameters related to
the potential misalignments between incidents, tickets, and alerts
timing information, i.e. BOD and FOD, in order to obtain the set of
representative events for the available dataset.
On the other hand, two questions have to be addressed to assess the
results: (1) whether the original events combined in each representative
event are really associated to that representative, and (2) whether all
the events associated to an incident are included in the representative
event. The answer to these questions is not straightforward due to the
lack of a ground truth to account for each class. Therefore, we devel-
oped a strategy in three steps, as described in Section 6.2, to address
these questions.
Fig. 8. Example showing the problem of directly applying the basic event correlation
model to two consecutive incidents.
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6.1. Real scenario: Dataset and preprocessing
The scenario considered is the network, event data and procedures
handled by a management company with which we are collaborating.
This company is in charge of the supervision, from a management point
of view, of the operation of the corporate network providing services to
the regional government. Thus, the supervised network serves millions
of habitants from many public sectors, such as education, health and
civil. The topology of the network resembles the organizational struc-
ture of the government and thus uses a hierarchical approach.
As previously mentioned, the handling of alerts and tickets inside
the company is performed by two diﬀerent departments: a technical
department, which is in charge of the eﬀective supervision of the net-
work and, subsequently, the alerts; and a service desk, which attends
the requests and complaints from customers. In what follows, we refer
to the technical department as MS (Management Staﬀ) and to the
Service Desk as SD. Both departments have the capability to create
tickets, although, as previously mentioned, MS do it mainly as a re-
sponse to alerts generated by some network failures or after receiving
some feedback from other sources, whereas SD will create tickets from
end-user complaints. This is an important fact from the point of view of
the current work, as it is expected that many of the tickets created by
MS have some pointers to the alerts triggering them, while the tickets
created by SD can provide richer information regarding the ongoing
incidents but no pointers to technical details or alerts is expected.
The data gathered in this scenario are the set of alerts and tickets in
the system during a period of six months spanning from October 1,
2013, to the end of March, 2014. It is important to note that no in-
formation regarding the topology, apart from a list of nodes and links
classiﬁed by MS as critical for the operation of the network, is con-
sidered.
The information included in each alert is presented in a ﬁxed struc-
tured format (Fig. 9), which is mapped to the elements in the model
(Section 3). It is relevant to mention that the aﬀected element name
(Object ID in the alert dataset) presents a hierarchical structure that ﬁts
with the topological counterpart. Alternately, tickets are far more com-
plex because they also include additional information related to incident
tracking and solution and various free text ﬁelds. Nevertheless, it is easy
to map some of these ﬁelds to the elements in the model.
A major inconvenience from this raw dataset that conditions the
manner in which the experiments are to be carried out is the lack of a
Fig. 9. Example of an alert format taken from the alert dataset.
Listing 1. Ticket-alert correlation algorithm.
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“ground truth,” i.e., a set of labeled incidents with their corresponding
alerts and tickets is not available. Furthermore, and as expected, we
manually found that not all of the tickets/alerts are related to real in-
cidents and that some of the tickets present incoherent or null values in
relevant ﬁelds. These types of alerts/tickets were removed during the
preprocessing step, for which we set up some rules, mainly based on
keyword detection, after some consultations with the staﬀ at the com-
pany.
The lack of labeled data can introduce some confusion in the in-
terpretation of the results, as not all the real alerts are to generate
tickets because the MS can consider them nonrelevant at a given time.
In fact, alerts in NMS are usually classiﬁed according to their severity
and/or criticality. Thus, not all of the alerts present the same eﬀects on
the stability of the managed system, and MS is prone to ignore or
postpone the creation of a ticket for non-critical alerts, especially if they
are busy trying to solve an incident with higher priority. As a con-
sequence, even if the number of tickets was accurate, not all of the
alerts would be correlated to a ticket, i.e., to an incident, which could
be interpreted as a failure in the proposed method.
To address this situation, we have checked the performance of the
correlation method with a special subset of events, that is, we only
consider relevant incidents. By relevant incidents, we refer to those that
aﬀect the operation of the network in a critical way and that, conse-
quently, must present associated tickets. According to the company’s
technical procedures, there are two situations in which an alert should
mandatorily trigger a ticket from MS: critical alerts, which are those
truly aﬀecting critical elements, and massive alerts, which are alerts
automatically generated by the NMS as a response to a large number of
alerts from topologically related elements in the network. The ﬁrst si-
tuation is identiﬁed by using a list of network nodes (the critical ones)
and the type of critical alerts (i.e., NodeDown, InterfaceDown) such that a
critical alert in a critical node should generate a ticket by MS.
Therefore, the main criterion for measuring the performance of the
proposed correlation procedure can be stated as
All relevant alerts should be assigned to a ticket.
Thus, during the preprocessing phase the relevant alerts are ex-
tracted, and the tickets related to critical nodes are identiﬁed. To cor-
relate the tickets (Section 4.1), we adopt the same methodologies
proposed in our previous work [49] to preprocess and correlate tickets
that have the same root causes. As a result, a set of representative tickets,
TC, arguably composed of a single ticket per network incident, is ob-
tained. For the alert database, the processed alerts are entered into the
correlation phase (Section 4.2), in which the proposed alert correlation
model is applied to obtain the set of representative alerts, AC. Similar to
the ticket case, a two-step procedure is used for alert correlation. In the
ﬁrst step, the correlation is applied to critical alerts. Then, massive
alerts are also considered. Both datasets are the input for application of
the ticket-alert correlation model presented in Section 5.
Some relevant ﬁgures for both the tickets and the alerts used during
the phases previous to the joint ticket-alert correlation are provided in
Table 2. The ﬁrst row ‘Total number of records’ represents the size of
raw datasets taken from the IT management company. ‘Mean number of
aﬀected elements/record’ provides the number of oﬃceIDs found in
each record. To extract this number, we applied pattern matching
methods to obtain the list of aﬀected elements for every event (ticket or
alert). ‘Number of records after preprocessing’ represents the remaining
number of records after the preprocessing step, mainly ﬁltering out
void/spamming events. ‘Number of relevant records’ gives the number
of records that contain at least one critical oﬃceID. As previously ex-
plained, these are the records used to assess the system. ‘Number of
representatives (before joint correlation)’ is the number of re-
presentative events in each correlated set after the ﬁrst step of the
correlation, that is, before applying the ticket-alert correlation module,
i.e., the number of alerts/tickets considered independent. Finally, the
last row of the table provides the average number of records for each
representative one.
6.2. Evaluation of the system
The evaluation of the performance of the proposed method is not
straightforward because, as previously stated, the dataset lacks a
ground truth in which the existing incidents are related to their cor-
responding alerts and tickets. Thus, despite some ﬁgures of merit being
obtained, a strategy to assess the results should be designed. A trivial
approach would be to manually label the dataset, or a part of it, to
properly check the obtained correlations. However, even if an expert
could manually handle that huge volume of data, the process would be
prone to errors because it is frequently diﬃcult to determine, even for
an experienced manager, what the real incidents are from the limited
information in the alerts and tickets and whether they are related.
Therefore, other approaches should be explored.
Alternately, as explained in Section 5, it is necessary to consider
some “border eﬀects” in the correlation procedure due to potential
misalignments between the real timing of an incident and its manifes-
tation in tickets and alerts, probably due to the humans involved not
being reactive enough. To handle this, the model uses two tunable
parameters: FOD, that is, the maximum accepted time from the ap-
pearance of the ﬁrst alert of an incident and its corresponding ticket;
and BOD, that is, the maximum accepted time from the end of the in-
cident and the closing of the ticket. Obviously, these two parameters
should be adjusted during the experimentation, which introduces an
additional degree of complexity for evaluating the proposal.
Therefore, we developed a strategy in three steps with diﬀerent
targets: ﬁrst, we assessed the precision of the correlation, in terms of the
number of correctly correlated elements; second, we analyzed the po-
tential impact of varying FOD and BOD, which is somehow related to
the recall; and, ﬁnally, we manually explored the reasons for portions of
the alerts and tickets not being correlated. The ﬁrst step is related to
question (1), while the second and third are related to question (2).
6.2.1. Precision estimation
Once the alerts and the tickets have been independently correlated
(See Table 2), we proceeded with the joint correlation of the obtained
representatives for alerts and tickets. As previously mentioned, we as-
sume that every critical incident should be univocally related to a ﬁnal
representative ticket. Therefore, in the next discussions, we refer to an
incident as a representative ticket after the joint correlation.
In this regard, given the set of representative events and the events
(alerts and/or tickets) associated to them, the precision of the correla-
tion, P, can deﬁned as the rate between the number of events correctly
associated to any of the representative events (TP) against the total
number of events associated to any of the representative events
( +TP FP), being FP the number of events incorrectly associated to any
of the representative events, that is, = +P TP TP FP/( ).
In a ﬁrst step, we varied FOD from 0.025 to 256 h, obtaining a
slightly diﬀerent number of incidents for each value of FOD and dif-
ferent numbers of alerts and tickets associated to each of the incidents.
Table 2
Number of records in the dataset and results for the independent correlation of alerts and
tickets.
Database Alerts Tickets
Total number of records 1,703,662 9612
Mean number of aﬀected elements/record 1.15 1.42
Number of records after preprocessing 913,042 8105
Number of relevant records 7436 520 (348 MS / 172 SD)
Number of representatives (before joint
correlation)
3022 256 (194 MS/ 62 SD)
Mean number of records / repr. set 2.46 2.03
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At this point, the problem is to assess whether all of the alerts and
tickets that have been correlated into a representative ticket are truly
related to that incident. Due to the lack of a ground truth, validating
these results is not straightforward. To overcome this issue, we esti-
mated the precision of the correlation by manually inspecting many
samples and applying the knowledge and rules of thumb provided by
the company management team, which helped us during this proce-
dure. Furthermore, for the cases that were not suﬃciently clear for us,
we obtained additional feedback from the company.
Consequently, for validation purposes, a set of 100 randomly chosen
incident samples, together with their correlated tickets and alerts, is
considered and studied manually. The result of the analysis is depicted
in Fig. 10, which shows the number of false positives, in terms of in-
cidents for which we found inappropriately assigned events, as a
function of the value for FOD. It is relevant to mention that for values of
FOD between 2 and 16 h, we found that 99 of the 100 samples were
undoubtedly classiﬁed as correctly correlated. The remaining sample is
not a clear case, as there is not enough information in the ticket and the
alerts to decide whether they are really related or not. Thus, assuming
the worst case, there is a single error in 100 samples, providing an
estimated value of 99% of a posteriori accuracy, that is, 99% of the
found correlations are correct at those operation points. This result
suggests to using a value of FOD lower than 2 h. As will be noted in the
next subsection, the greater the value of FOD, the greater the percen-
tage of correlated elements. Therefore, we select 1 h for FOD.
To conﬁrm the validity of these results, we complemented the in-
spection with another check. For this, we evaluated various indicators for
the timings of the incidents, as shown in Table 3. In this regard, as ex-
plained in Section 5, one of the most conﬂictive cases for the correlation
was related to consecutive incidents aﬀecting the same network ele-
ments. To be more conﬁdent about the results and have insight into this
particular case, we can consider the delay between the ﬁrst appeared
alert for each incident and the closing time of the previous ticket, if any,
including any of the aﬀected elements in the incident, that is, the interval
to the previous potentially related ticket. As shown in Table 3, the mean
value for this magnitude is 33.3 h., which is signiﬁcantly greater than the
selected value for FOD. This can be interpreted as a clear indication that
the ﬁrst appeared alert is related to the current incident and not to a
previous one for the selected FOD value of 1 h.
6.2.2. Joint correlation results
Another relevant parameter to evaluate the performance of the
system is the recall, deﬁned as = +recall TP TP FN/( ), where TP is the
number of events that are correctly correlated to any representative
event and FN is the number of events that are incorrectly kept un-
correlated to any representative event. Under the assumption that every
relevant incident should generate at least one ticket and that all the
relevant alerts should be associated to an incident, FN is equal to the
number of alerts not being correlated to a representative event.
However, similar to the case of the estimation of the precision, both
FOD and BOD may play an important role in the percentage of corre-
lated elements. Simply stated, if FOD (or BOD) is suﬃciently large, all
of the alerts and tickets related to a common element may end up
correlated, thus providing an artiﬁcially high value for the recall.
To evaluate this eﬀect, a series of experiments were carried out by
varying the values of FOD and BOD. It is worth mentioning that these
experiments were made in parallel with those described in the previous
section, all of them mainly targeted at tuning the system. The percen-
tage of alerts correlated to incidents as a function of the values of FOD
and BOD is presented in Fig. 11. As shown and as expected, as FOD or
BOD increases, the percentage of correlated alerts does as well, which
would imply that the greater FOD/BOD is, the better the correlation is.
However, this might be an erroneous conclusion, as large values for
FOD/BOD would merge together independent incidents involving some
common aﬀected element. Alternately, having long delays is not rea-
sonable in ticket creation (FOD) for critical incidents. Regardless, the
ﬁgure shows that there is no relevant inﬂuence from the value of FOD in
the results for FOD below 64 h. This was somehow expected because
the delay in the closing of the last ticket should be associated with a
lack of related alerts, not the presence of them. The behavior in relation
to BOD is similar.
These results, together with the analysis of the tickets/alerts that
resulted in inappropriate merges (correlation errors), as described in
the previous subsection, made us select FOD=BOD=1 h.
The correlation results taking into account only the tickets created
by MS are listed in Table 4. As shown, approximately 80% of the re-
presentative tickets and 46% of the representative alerts potentially
related to relevant incidents are correlated. Furthermore, if we consider
the initial non-correlated tickets and alerts, up to 70.3% of the alerts
and 84.5% of the tickets are correlated. For the tickets, this means that
84.5% of them are truly related to relevant incidents (there exist as-
sociated critical alerts), which provides no further information on the
quality of the correlation itself, as the remaining 15.5% could be related
to the critical nodes they refer to but not to a critical episode. In fact, we
ended up with 40 tickets not correlated to any alert, which deserves a
Fig. 10. Number of incorrectly correlated incidents (false positives) for diﬀerent values of
FOD.
Table 3
Mean values for some variables for the correlated subset (FOD=1 h.).
Ticket lifetime 58.8 h
Incident lifetime 81.4 h
Number of rep. alerts/ sample 5.5
Number of alerts/rep. alert 4.8
Interval to previous potentially related ticket 33.3 h
Fig. 11. Percentage of correlated alerts at diﬀerent values for FOD and BOD.
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posterior analysis. Alternately, having only 46.0% of the relevant re-
presentative alerts be correlated to a ticket is, at ﬁrst sight, not a very
good result, although it represents an advance that no other similar
system has achieved. Therefore, this result requires deeper analysis to
ﬁnd the potential causes for such a ﬁgure, which is addressed next.
6.2.3. Analysis of the non-correlated alerts
Although the eﬀectiveness of the proposed technique in terms of
improperly correlated events has been shown to be high –question (1)–,
approximately half of the representative relevant alerts are not assigned
to a ticket –question (2)–, which requires further analysis. According to
the protocols in use at the company, all of the considered alerts should
have generated tickets from MS. This incoherency can be initially at-
tributed to the fact that the proposed method is not accurate enough.
However, an improper application of that policy or some problems with
the staﬀ could also explain it. Therefore, we analyzed those non-cor-
related alerts in search of some explanation for them not triggering
tickets. For this we considered two potentially inﬂuential factors: the
alert durations and inter-arrival delays of alerts having the same af-
fected element.
The analysis of the duration of the non-correlated alerts provided
the results shown in Fig. 12. As a ﬁrst conclusion, we observed that a
signiﬁcant percentage of them present a short duration, which also
implies that they are shown as active in the management console for a
short time. This ﬁnding motivated us to further analyze those alerts.
With the help of the MS, we reached to the conclusion that a short
duration alert can be considered irrelevant and that the dedication of
the staﬀ to other tasks can also hide them, thus not generating tickets
from MS. In fact, up to 64.3% of the uncorrelated alerts can be attrib-
uted to this eﬀect if we consider a threshold of 10 mins for their
durations, which seems reasonable for the MS.
To continue with the analysis, for alerts that have durations greater
than 10 mins, we analyzed the inter-arrival delay between consecutive
alerts having the same aﬀected element to see if they are created close
in time or if there is a time gap between them. Fig. 13 shows the his-
togram of the inter-arrival delays. We found that more than 80% of
them were repeated within a period greater than 2 days, that is, most of
them appear and, despite its long or short duration, no additional alert
related to the same aﬀected element appears in at least two days. This
means that the alert is scaling down in the list of active alerts on the
management console. Therefore, we conclude that the lack of an as-
sociated ticket can be possibly attributed to the existence of a “window
of opportunity” for the creation of the tickets. Thus, if an alert does not
trigger a ticket within a given period and it is not repeated, it is likely it
will not trigger a ticket at all. After consultation, MS conﬁrmed this
observation.
Additionally, and besides the above conclusion for the last subset,
we found that approximately 68.8% of the non-correlated alerts in-
cluded names for aﬀected elements not conforming to the naming
conventions in use. After consulting with the staﬀ, we were informed
that these types of elements, despite being classiﬁed as critical ones,
have special functions that are not being used by other nodes. Thus, the
MS do not usually open tickets for those types of aﬀected elements. That
is, we were initially provided with an inaccurate list of critical nodes.
As a resume, Fig. 14 summarizes the results from the assessment of
both correlated and non-correlated alerts. It is worth mentioning that if
we accept that alerts lasting less than 10 mins are prone to being ig-
nored, only 10.6% of the initial alerts remain uncorrelated due to un-
known reason. Considering those with names conforming to the critical
nodes list, the percentage of non-correlated critical alerts is con-
siderably reduced to 7.3% with the proposed method.
6.2.4. Analysis of the non-correlated tickets
As shown in Table 4, there exist 40 representative tickets that are
not correlated to any representative alert after applying the joint cor-
relation. This is an unexpected result, as it is supposed that all these
tickets are opened by technical staﬀ as a response to abnormal events in
critical nodes, which implies the appearance of critical alerts. Similar to
the alerts, these tickets have been found to have some insights into the
potential causes for them not being correlated. In this analysis, the
Table 4
Correlation results considering only tickets created by the MS group.
Alerts Tickets
Number of raw input elements 7436 348
Number of representatives (before joint
correlation)
3022 194
Number of representatives correlated by joint
correlation
1391 (46.0%) 154 (79.4%)
Number of raw elements correlated (after joint
correlation)
5228 (70.3%) 294 (84.5%)
Fig. 12. Histogram for the duration of the non-correlated alerts.
Fig. 13. Interarrival delay between consecutive non correlated alerts having the same
aﬀected element.
Fig. 14. Distribution of the number of raw alerts among the diﬀerent assessment criteria.
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original dataset of alerts, as provided by the corporation, is also con-
sidered to check for any potential problem during the preprocessing and
later phases of the procedures. Nevertheless, as in the previous cases,
manual inspection is not trivial because the available information from
tickets and alerts can be inconclusive or even incomplete.
The manual analysis of these 40 tickets provided up to 9 diﬀerent
potential causes (Fig. 15):
1. Maintenance. These tickets are generated during maintenance op-
erations in some elements of the network, both programmed and un-
programmed. No associated alerts are found in the alert dataset,
probably because they are ﬁltered out during the maintenance
procedures.
2. Massive. These tickets are related to massive failures in ADSL con-
nections at critical oﬃceIDs although no associated MASSIVE alert is
present in the alert dataset. The free text ﬁelds in the ticket refer to
NodeIDs that are not critical, and thus they are not included in the
alert dataset.
3. No alert. No associated alert is found in the alert dataset for the
ticket duration or its vicinity, despite the NodeIDs being critical.
4. Border. Tickets generated at the beginning of the observation period
(ﬁrst 2 days) with no associated alert in the dataset. Some of them
even refer to alerts and previous tickets outside of the observation
period.
5. Non-critical oﬃceID. The value for the oﬃceID refers to one of the
non-conforming names, so it should not be considered a critical
oﬃceID.
6. Non-critical alert. There exists at least one alert related to this ticket,
but it is not a critical reason. Thus, the alerts were removed during
preprocessing.
7. Handling error. The NodeID for this ticket is wrong. The incident is
not truly related to that NodeID.
8. User-initiated. Although these tickets come from MS, some of them
are generated as a response to phone calls from the technicians at
diﬀerent locations. No alerts are observed, and most of them are
related to internal problems at the location, e.g., a local email server
not responding.
9. Too much delay. There exist alerts potentially related to these
tickets, but they are placed outside the considered FOD or BOD.
As a result, we can conclude that 28 of these tickets (user-initiated,
non-critical alert, non-critical oﬃceID, maintenance, handling error and
massive) should have been ﬁltered out because they are not opened as a
response to the observation of critical alerts by the MS. Alternately,
border tickets can obviously be attributed to an experimental limitation
related to the observation period. Furthermore, the lack of correlation
for the no alert class cannot be attributed to the correlation method, as
no related alerts are found. This could be due to a problem with the
acquisition of the alert dataset. Finally, the 2 tickets in the too much
delay class are clearly related to the limitations of the proposed method
to handle events when the creation of the tickets is not responsive en-
ough.
In summary, from the set of 348 initial tickets, 2 are not properly
correlated by the proposed method due to its limitations, 38 are not
correlated due to the lack of related information in the alert dataset due
to diﬀerent reasons, and 308 are correctly correlated.
7. Applications
Finally, we discuss and evaluate two possible applications of the
proposed method. Two major contributions can be identiﬁed: im-
provement of alert correlation, and provision of some insights into
evaluating the eﬃciency of the management team handling network
incidents.
7.1. Alert reduction
The results regarding the capabilities of the ticket-alert correlation
provided in Section 6.2 are a clear indicator of the potentialities of the
proposed method. As shown in Table 4, there is a large reduction in the
number of alert representatives, that is, in the number of diﬀerent alerts
after alert clustering when including the information from the tickets.
In fact, 1391 of the initial 3022 representative alerts after alert corre-
lation are associated with 194 incidents; that is, those 1391 re-
presentative alerts are merged into 194 representative ones through the
joint correlation, with an average of 7.17 representative alerts per in-
cident. Therefore, the ﬁnal alert set to consider contains only 1825
alerts (those representative alerts not correlated by joint correlation
plus the 194 newly correlated representatives), that is, half of the ori-
ginal correlated set and 1/4 of the original number of alerts. Further-
more, the analysis of the alerts that could not be correlated evidences a
low conﬁdence in their relevance.
These results conﬁrm our intuition regarding related alerts not
overlapped in time (Fig. 3) and the inclusion of additional relationships
created by tickets. Therefore, we conclude from this interesting ﬁnding
that incorporating ticket information into the alert correlation process
will deﬁnitely help in reducing a higher percentage of related alerts.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that we have not yet used the
full potentiality of the system, as the tickets from SD have not been used
during the assessment of the method. The information in these tickets
can be far more signiﬁcant than that in the MS tickets because they
incorporate the end users’ perceptions of the incident.
Alternately, if we consider the tickets related to both MS and SD, we
might check whether SD systems play an important role in the incident-
solving process by applying the correlation algorithm to tickets created
by both the MS and SD groups.
The results, shown in Table 5, evidence that the proposed correla-
tion model is able to correlate tickets from SD at a similar percentage as
that for tickets from MS and that the inclusion of these tickets improves
the results. In particular, there is a 6.8% increase in the percentage of
raw correlated alerts, and more importantly, the number of correlated
Fig. 15. Results from the analysis of the uncorrelated tickets.
Table 5
Correlation results for relevant tickets created by both the MS and SD groups.
Alerts Tickets
Number of raw input elements 7436 520
Number of representatives (before joint
correlation)
3022 256
Number of raw elements correlated (after joint
correlation)
5734 (77.1%) 436 (83.8%)
Number of representatives correlated 1683 (55.7%) 189 (73.8%)
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incidents rises from 154 to 189. This means that SD is not only creating
redundant tickets, as would be a priori expected, but also generating
tickets for incidents not acknowledged by the technical staﬀ.
Therefore, we can conclude that: i) SD systems are meaningful to
assist in the incident-solving problem and are not just a call center for
handling customer calls and complaints; and ii) the proposed method is
able to incorporate relevant information, which is not available from
any other source, into the correlation process, thus improving the
quality of the results and reducing the number of elements in the
output.
7.2. Measuring staﬀ eﬃciency
A second good candidate application for our system is in providing
some insight into how to assist with and evaluate the eﬃciency of the
management team in the incident resolution process. The proposed
system might help decision-makers in answering several questions re-
lated to the quality of the management, such as the following: How
fast/accurate is the staﬀ? Do all the working shifts and management
groups behave the same way?
As an example, consider the case in which the operator is interested
in a measure of the reaction time of the management team, a group of
persons or even an individual member of the staﬀ in dealing with in-
cidents; e.g., we need to measure how much time the management team
needs to open a ticket for an ongoing incident. We can measure the
delay between the ﬁrst appeared alert and the ﬁrst ticket creation time
of an incident. In this case, we obtained an average value of 1.27 h.
However, if we need to measure how much time the management team
needs to close a ticket for an already resolved incident, we can measure
the delay between the ﬁrst resolved alert and the last resolved ticket
related to an incident. In our case, the mean value for this magnitude is
132.3 h, which is certainly a large value. Similarly, other measures from
the model can be used and interpreted.
Another example is related to the assessment of the performance of
the working shifts. Because the number of persons in charge of the
management uses is not the same for all shifts and the workload is
usually diﬀerent, the analysis of the correlated alerts and tickets for the
diﬀerent working shifts can reveal relevant information. In particular,
the analyzed company considers three working shifts in a day: the
morning shift (MorS), from 7:00 AM to 15:00 PM; the afternoon shift
(AS), from 15:00 PM to 23:00 PM; and the night shift (NS), from 23:00
PM to 7:00 AM. Furthermore, the characteristics of the working shifts
change during weekends or holidays. The analysis of non-correlated
relevant alerts as a function of the working shift is summarized in
Table 6. As shown, there exist diﬀerences in the working shift regarding
the distributions of incidents (alerts) and the percentage of non-corre-
lated alerts. During MorS and AS shifts, the percentage of non-corre-
lated alerts is not in consonance with the percentage of existing alerts.
In fact, it seems that AS is less responsive to alerts than MorS and NS,
which can imply a shortage in personnel. The opposite occurs for RS.
8. Conclusions and future work
Our main contribution in this article is to show that leveraging the
information provided by incident tickets is relevant to increase the ef-
ﬁciency of the usual incident management process in a corporate net-
work. To achieve this target, we have proposed a methodology to
incorporate incident-related semantic information, coming in the form
of tickets created by users and management staﬀ, into an alert database
that contains incident-related information from a network perspective.
Adding human knowledge and relevance into the process enhances the
quality of the discovery of incidents. Also, our ﬁndings showed that
incorporating such types of information in the alert correlation process
increase the alert reduction rate, and consequently speed up the diag-
nosing process. Furthermore, this rate is increased even more when
considering tickets created by Service Desk systems. At the same time,
the proposed methodology is based on simple elements and reasoning,
making its application in a real NMS, by both management staﬀ and
decision makers, almost straightforward. Finally, we conclude that any
new good solution for the alert correlation problem should consider
such kind of expert information in its design.
8.1. Limitations
Although the lightweight approach proposed here can relate alerts
and tickets together and hypothesize about possible relationships be-
tween them, it is limited in several ways. First, the main assumption
behind this approach is that it correlates the timely overlapped tickets
and/or alerts and does not cover the non-overlapped sets beyond the
time thresholds, BOD and FOD. Besides, the approach treats any two
simultaneous diﬀerent incidents that aﬀect a common resource as a
single one and thus a single representative event will be generated.
Second, the algorithm used for the initial alert correlation is really
simple and also based in temporary relationships and node identity
similarities. This is by choice, as the focus was on demonstrating that
tickets can help to improve the correlation. The proposed method can
be easily adapted to consider any of the available alert correlation
methods for this module, and even for the ticket correlation module,
with the only limitation being that timestamps are required at the
output. Third, the similarity and ﬁltering criteria used for alerts and
tickets depend on various rules and a list of human-provided keywords
that may depend on the considered network.
8.2. Future work
Once the relevance of including the tickets in the correlation pro-
cedures is shown, the next steps should be targeted at improving the
eﬃciency of the entire system. For this, as noted in the previous
paragraph, two major issues can be addressed: improving the elemen-
tary correlation modules by using state-of-the-art methods and in-
cluding new sources of information, e.g., topological, that complement
the similarity function to set relationships between the events.
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